Feb

23

How many traders would choose to trade where:

1. Their counterparty to each trade also sets their margin requirements.

2. The counterparty to each trade knows the exact capital position and portfolio wide standing.

3. The counterparty to each trade is able to set prices on all positions in the portfolio as well as the current trade in times of stress. (Was this hidden deep in the swap confirm?)

4. Mass liquidation of the portfolio generates massive fees for ones counterparty, such that they have every incentive to push you in time of stress.

This is not retail forex, this is the status of things in many Leveraged Loan portfolios. While times were good, did any of these conditions seem like severe disadvantages? My guess is that these were the little details, overlooked in the rush to become involved in this "exciting" asset class that offered exciting diversification opportunities.

Portfolios in my group have in the last few weeks breached collateral tests that in essence triggered massive stop loss selling. In some cases (Rule 3 above) the mark to market pricing has changed: whereas in prior periods it has been done with a service like markit, now the price feed has been swapped, and wouldn't you know it, the pricing is just low enough (and always below markit) to trigger portfolio liquidation.

My prior view a few months back seemed more optimistic: Lower prices balanced by "strong hands" looking for value. Lately, it has not felt that way at all. Just massive selling.

Yet some adapt, rather than die. Conversion from total return to cash flow deals is a mutation that may allow those who adapt in similar fashion to hang on.

This is an ant level view, I am left wondering how these losses will play out in the larger picture.

I am not sure in which book or which writing it was, but I am reminded of the admonishment not to compete in a game where ones competitor had every possible cost and information advantage. Yet, it seems the competitor is often hidden behind a veil called "service provider" making it hard to distinguish when one is in such a position until the moment of stress, when it becomes clear.


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2 Comments so far

  1. David Whitesel on February 24, 2008 8:56 am

    Portfolios in my group have in the last few weeks breached collateral tests that in essence triggered massive stop loss selling. In some cases (Rule 3 above) the mark to market pricing has changed: whereas in prior periods it has been done with a service like markit, now the price feed has been swapped, and wouldn’t you know it, the pricing is just low enough (and always below markit) to trigger portfolio liquidation

    I may not be on the same page with you here, so forgive me if your talking apples and i oranges.

    It appears to me; that the proper action of your program would have been to understand that Price is an artifact of prevailing systems intent, and therefore your portfolios brain should distinguish first, that there are two kinds of selling working against price and your portfolios bottom line values, one kind; is the kind, programmed to generate your portfolios response. so imho, a programs awareness directed your portfolios to a purpose, and as a manger, it forces you to ask yourself, is this the intent you sought?

    In the classic sense, you may need to reboot creating a counter program, against the noise of selling.

  2. Joe Davis on February 24, 2008 10:44 pm

    Your last comment:: “Yet, it seems the competitor is often hidden behind a veil called “service provider” making it hard to distinguish when one is in such a position until the moment of stress, when it becomes clear.”

    Applies very well to the latest debacle in the Auction Preferred space. Here we have the banks and brokers standing behind a market for 20 YEARS, and virtually overnight deciding to pull that support.

    While Muni fund holders might have had some warning, there was little reason to suspect that non muni related Closed End Fund ARPS would become totally illiquid. Contagion is a terrible thing. I imagine the banks decided they could not discriminate and decided to pork everyone at once. Another blog suggests they will be subject to major class action lawsuits and I agree.

    I look up and see a flock of Black Swans.

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