Mar

2

John Cochrane explains it:

"The Fed may have deliberately dug itself in a hole. By buying lots of long-term bonds, the Fed will take big mark to market losses if interest rates rise, and stop remitting money to the Treasury. This is a precommitment not to raise rates. So, a good answer to "how did QE 'work'" is not just by implicitly promising to keep rates low for a long time, but by making it very hard to raise rates!"

and the sequel: 

If "respectable central banks" have agreed that no exchanges between them will be refused, then the primary risk of domestic "easing" has disappeared for those countries. Their banking systems can simply accept central bank transfers instead of customer deposits as the base on which to issue credit. The problem for the unrespectable countries is that they cannot rely on foreign counter-parties to take their IOUs. They can, like all other countries that lack a weight and measure definition of money, have their central banks redeem their outstanding debts by issuing reserves; but they can't sell their new debt to anyone but themselves. When Bagehot wrote that the Bank of England could draw specie from the moon if it raised the discount high enough, he was assuming that the Old Lady's credit rating - its ability to redeem paper with coin - was unaffected by the change in rates. If, as Cochrane argues, reserves that pay market interest rates have no monetarist effects for prices, then credit creation is now being rationed even in the "respectable" countries not by reserves but by uncertainty about repayment by anyone not already a member of the primary dealer club.


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